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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the effects of government regulations and incentives on the setting of 
transfer prices.  I found significant main effects of both variables on transfer price choices.  
Transfer pricing is important, particularly for Multinational Corporations (MNCs), because of 
increased trends toward globalization of business activities and, simultaneously, decentralization. 
These trends have led to increased pressures for sound internal pricing systems, specifically 
transfer pricing, in order for organizations to ensure optimal and efficient allocations of 
organization resources and to provide profit performance measurements (Tang 1992).  It has 
generally been recognized in the literature that in order to maximize after tax cash flows, MNCs 
shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions.  Governments in some countries, particularly those 
with high tax rates, are greatly concerned as to whether or not companies attempt to avoid tax 
liabilities via transfer pricing manipulation, specifically in terms of trying to shift profits to lower 
tax jurisdictions, and have enacted laws to limit transfer price choice. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ransfer pricing is an important issue for organizations today, particularly Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs), because of increased trends toward globalization of business activities and simultaneously, 
decentralization. These trends have led to increased pressures for sound internal pricing systems, 
specifically transfer pricing, in order for organizations to ensure optimal and efficient allocation of organization 
resources and to provide profit performance measurements (Tang 1992).  Some argue that incorporating incentive 
mechanisms into transfer pricing decisions could, as management control tools, better align managers/decision 
makers‟ objectives with corporate objectives, such as maximization of overall corporate bottom-line profits.   
However, governments in some countries, namely those with high tax rates, are greatly concerned as to whether or not 
companies attempt to avoid tax liabilities via transfer pricing manipulation in order to shift profits out of their 
countries to lower tax jurisdictions.  
  
Prior studies on transfer pricing have suggested that environmental variables, such as tax rates, incentive 
compensations, and government regulations are important issues concerning MNCs (Tang 1992, Chan & Landry 
2004).    However, few empirical papers investigate how government regulations affect decision making regarding 
transfer price choices particularly in multinational settings.   The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
government regulations on the choice of international transfer prices in an experimental setting.  The results of this 
experimental study provide empirical evidence, as the literature suggested, that environmental factors, in this case 
government regulations, significantly affected decision making regarding international transfer price choices.  
Furthermore, participants were influenced in predictable ways, thus suggesting that decision makers' transfer price 
choices could be influenced. This finding, namely the effect of pay incentives, enforces the notion that compensation 
schemes be designed such that optimal, as opposed to suboptimal, outcomes are rewarded. 
 
The reminding of this paper is organized in the following sections.  Section II reviews transfer pricing 
regulations in selected countries.  Section III provides hypotheses development.  Section VI discusses research 
method.  Section V covers statistical results.  Section IV presents discussions and recommendations for the future 
research. 
 
 
T 
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Review of Selected Countries’ Transfer Pricing Regulations 
 
Given the increased globalization of business, intracompany transactions account for more than 40 percent of 
business in international trade (Tang 1992; Choi and Mueller1992).  Transfer pricing has become an important 
international issue as governments are become concerned whether companies attempt to avoid tax liabilities via 
transfer pricing manipulation. Thus, in some cases, governments have enacted tax regulations to limit transfer pricing 
choice.  
  
In the United States, for example, section 482
1
 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) attempts to address such 
manipulation by requiring application of three related criteria to include (1) the arm‟s-length standard; (2) the best 
method rule; and (3) comparability analysis.  Although the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires that 
intracompany transfer pricing be based on an “arm-length price”, the Internal Revenue Code section 482 still allows 
corporations to use one of several acceptable transfer pricing methods subject to the best method rule for sales and 
transfer of tangible property. Thus, the code continues to provide corporate management with some flexibility and 
leeway with regard to transfer pricing decision making.  For instance, the six acceptable “arms-length” transfer pricing 
methods include (1) the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP); (2) the resale price method (RPM); (3) the cost 
plus method (CPLM); (4) the comparable profits method (CPM); (5) the profit split method (PSM); and (6) 
unspecified methods (U.S. Treasury Regulation 1.482). 
 
With regard to the U.S. IRC Section 482 regulations on transfer pricing, Anthony and Govindarajan (1998, 
767) commented that “[a]lthough there are legal restrictions on a company‟s flexibility in transfer pricing, there is 
considerable latitude within these restrictions”. Furthermore, government regulations and tax systems also vary from 
country to country which, in turn, possibly gives different degrees of latitude to management with regard to choice of 
transfer pricing and methods used. 
 
For example, Australia issues transfer price regulations through the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). These 
closely follow the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publication Transfer Pricing 
Guidance for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration, 1995 OECD, Taxation Ruling (TR) 97/20 which also 
provides a number of internationally accepted methodologies to test compliance with the arm‟s-length principle and 
TR 98/11. TR 98/11 complements TR 97/20 on arm‟s-length transfer pricing methods. Another possible option for 
taxpayers to solve the transfer pricing problem is to enter into Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) with respective 
countries' government agents. However, APA can be costly due to the extensive supporting documentation required. 
Also, APA might require disclosure of sensitive business details. Accordingly, many businesses do not use APA (Tate 
1998, 47). In addition, companies intending to avoid tax liabilities would not choose APA. In this regard, the United 
States General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) (1992, 65) commented that: 
 
APA may not be as widely effective as hoped in attacking transfer pricing problems. One reason is that they 
may be self-selecting – those taxpayers likely to be making good faith compliance efforts are most likely to use 
voluntary process. 
 
As with the U.S. regulations, the Australian regulations grant a certain degree of latitude to management with 
regard to choice of transfer pricing and methods used. Other nations may have analogous regulations particularly with 
regard to offering latitude of choice, although the extent and intended rigor of the different countries‟ regulations vary. 
In this regard, Choi and Mueller (1992, 523) commented: 
 
Managers of multinational companies reportedly regard the German tax authorities as most rigorous, followed by the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Australia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and a host of other 
countries appear to be less meticulous in examining international transfer price. Countries eager to attract foreign 
investment, such as Ireland and Puerto Rico, are regarded as not having much interest in transfer pricing issues.  
                                                 
1
 The United States released the final regulation of section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) on July 1, 1994, 
effective for taxable years beginning after October 6, 1994, which established specified transfer pricing methods and 
regulations for corporations . 
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A summary of transfer pricing regulations for sales or transfer of tangible goods of selected countries including 
Australia, Canada, China, Japan, and the United States is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Transfer Pricing Regulations of Selected Countries 
Regarding Sale or Transfer of Tangible Goods or Property 
 
Countries Regulations Issued Arm’s-Length Price Acceptable Methods 
United States IRC Section 482 July 1994 1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method, 
4) the comparable profits method, 
5) the profit split methods 
Australia ATO TR98/11 
(complements TR97/20 on arm‟s-
length transfer pricing methodologies) 
June 1998 1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method, 
If all fails, arm‟s-length price is based on profit 
split and transaction net margin methods 
Canada Revenue Canada Information Circular 
No. 87-2 
(Tang 1997) 
Feb 1987 1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method, 
4) other reasonable method 
China Income Tax Law of the People‟s 
Republic of China for Foreign 
Investment Enterprises (FIEs) and 
Foreign Enterprises (FEs) (Income Tax 
Law); 
 
Regulations for the Implementation of 
the Income Tax Law of the People‟s 
Republic of China for Foreign 
Investment Enterprises and Foreign 
Enterprises (Implementation 
Regulations) 
(Tang 1997) 
1991 1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method, 
4) other reasonable method 
International 
Accounting 
Standards 
(IAS) 
IAS 24 Related Party Disclosure Jan 1986 
 
Revision 
Dec 2003 
1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method 
 
Japan Article 66-5 of the Special Taxation 
Measures Law (STML) 
 
(Tang 1997) 
Mar 1986 1)  the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
2) the resale price method, 
3) the cost plus method, 
4) other method 
*The Law does not specific a priority in the use 
of the first three methods. 
 
 
 Noting, in addition to the varying government restrictions previously discussed, the diversity of accounting 
practice of different countries, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has pushed for ongoing 
international accounting harmonization and disclosure (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993). Currently, no International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) exists regarding the transfer pricing issue. However, IAS 24, “Related Party Disclosure”, 
paragraph 11 (p.431), states that “[a]ccounting recognition of a transfer of resources is normally based on the price 
agreed between the parties. Between unrelated parties the price is an arm‟s-length price”. However, “[r]elated parties 
may have a degree of flexibility in the price-setting process that is not present in transactions between unrelated 
parties”.  In other words, similar to the IRC S482 in the United States and ATO 97/20 in Australia, IAS 24 allows 
related parties to use a variety of methods to include the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price 
method and the cost-plus method, to price transactions. However, the uncontrolled price method and the gross margin 
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of the resale price method can be difficult to implement.  For instance, under the cost plus method, the IASC notes 
“[d]ifficulties may be experienced in determining both the elements of cost attributable and the mark-up (IAS 24, 
paragraph 15)”, thus contributing to the complexity of the transfer pricing decision. 
 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Some transfer pricing studies have found empirical results to support the proposition that MNCs (decision 
makers) would maximize overall corporate tax benefits via transfer pricing manipulations.  As a result, government 
regulations typically attempt to restrict the setting of transfer prices in order to prevent manipulation of profits 
particularly by moving reported profits from high tax to low tax jurisdictions (Borkowski, 1997). Enforcement may 
include penalties and extra taxes which in turn could negatively affect overall corporate profitability.  Some studies 
using surveys suggest that government regulations do affect transfer pricing decisions, meaning that decision makers 
would make transfer pricing decisions that would minimize government-imposed costs or penalties.  Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is offered: 
 
H1A Government regulations significantly affect individuals‟ international transfer price choices. 
 
 As discussed early, government regulations, generally meaning restrictions on setting transfer prices in order 
to prevent companies from manipulating profits and avoiding tax liabilities, present themselves only in an 
environment of taxes. Some jurisdictions may impose penalties and extra taxes which in turn can affect overall 
corporate profitability.  The literature has suggested that a management control system, including designing an 
incentive package, should be in place to motivate managers/decision makers to choose transfer prices that serve the 
best interests of principals to include maximizing overall corporate profits and minimizing government-imposed costs. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
H2A  Compensation schemes significantly affect decision makers‟ transfer price choices.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
108 Australian business practitioners voluntarily participated in the research exercise.  Participants had 
completed a university undergraduate degree.  Generally, participants were given a set of facts, asked to choose a 
preferred transfer price, and answered some questions in a post-questionnaire.  
 
Experimental Task and Procedure 
 
The experimental task was designed by Chan (2001). The participants essentially acted as Subsidiary A's 
managers for a small private international firm which had two wholly owned subsidiaries located in different countries 
with different tax rates.  In the task, both of the subsidiaries were operated as profit centers; and, thus, the managers of 
the subsidiary were responsible for their revenues and expenses as well as profits.  However, some of the decisions, 
including the transfer pricing policy, such as the transfer pricing method, profit mark-ups, and a limit on the range of 
transfer prices, were made by top management of the company.  Accordingly, Subsidiary A could set the preferred 
transfer price from seven possibilities only in the range of US$40 to US$70 per unit.  The seven possible transfer 
prices (choice 1 to choice 7) were $40, $45, $50, $55, $60, $65, and $70 (see Table 2) 
 
Table 2: Transfer Price Choices Possibilities in the Task 
 
Please tick (check) your choice.  Choose only one answer.  
 
Choice 1 
(US$ 40) 
Choice 2 
(US$ 45) 
Choice 3 
(US$ 50) 
Choice 4 
(US$ 55) 
Choice 5 
(US$ 60) 
Choice 6 
(US$ 65) 
Choice 7 
(US$ 70) 
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Participants were provided monetary incentives that would depend on the incentive schemes stated in their 
individual packages and their specific transfer price choice.  The seven possible transfer price choice options and 
related compensation possibilities were shown in the task.  Participants knew in advance that all calculations were 
provided.  Participants were randomly assigned to six different treatment (a 2 x 3 factorial design) tasks by randomly 
assigning prenumbered experimental packets. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable was a specific choice of transfer prices.   The seven choices corresponded to transfer 
prices that ranged in US$ 5 increments from US$ 40 to US$ 70 (see Table 2). 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Government regulations were operationalized by introducing either a no government regulation or a 
government regulation that required that profits of subsidiary A and B be approximately equally split given the range 
of pricing choices.  Government Regulations treatment was specifically stated in the instruments as follows:  
Government Regulations (which may restrict transfer pricing):  
 
The government restricts transfer price setting. 
 
There is a 100% probability that the government will audit (review) your transfer price.  The government is 
concerned that companies may try to report low earnings in order to avoid taxes.  If the government audits Subsidiary 
A and discovers that the transfer price is set too low, then the government will penalize Subsidiary A.  The government 
penalty consists of the government confiscating (which means taking) all of Subsidiary A’s incremental profits above 
the midpoint transfer price.  This penalty is considered an extra tax and therefore reduces the Net Profit after Tax of 
Subsidiary A.  The government defines a transfer price as “too low” when Subsidiary A picks a transfer price that is 
less than the midpoint of the range of transfer price possibilities.  
 
The government restrictions on transfer pricing effects for each transfer price option have already been calculated 
and are already included in the Net Profit After Tax for Subsidiary A, Subsidiary B, and the Overall Corporation 
figures that are shown in the table provided you. 
 
Incentive schemes were operationalized via the payment of a fixed salary, a fixed salary plus a bonus based 
on subsidiary A‟s profit, or a fixed salary plus a bonus based on overall corporate net income. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Control variables were not manipulated in the experiment and most were randomized across all treatments.  
A post-test questionnaire was used to measure subjects' perceptions of these control variables and mediating variables 
of interest, as suggested by Schulz (1999). 
 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
Analysis of Covariance (ANOCA) was performed.  Results from an Analysis of Covariance (ANOCA; not 
provided) were insignificant, thus, suggesting that randomization was successful. 
 
Descriptive Data 
 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively, show descriptive results while Table 5 indicates the predicted choices along 
with the actual means.  Note that in Table 4 52.8 % (57 of 108) of participants chose transfer price choice #4.   
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Table 3: Frequencies 
choice
13 12.0 12.0 12.0
4 3.7 3.7 15.7
16 14.8 14.8 30.6
57 52.8 52.8 83.3
11 10.2 10.2 93.5
1 .9 .9 94.4
6 5.6 5.6 100.0
108 100.0 100.0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulat iv e
Percent
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Data of Transfer Price Choices by Cell 
 
1Gov’t 
Reg 
2Comp Cell (n=18) Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Std. Error 
of Mean 
Min Max 
No 3Fixed Salary 1 3.11 1.41 1.99 .33 1 5 
No 4Subsidiary Bonus 2 4.11 1.41 1.99 .33 1 7 
No 5Corporate Bonus 3 2.67 1.61 2.59 .38 1 7 
Yes Fixed Salary 4 3.56 .98 .97 .23 1 5 
Yes Subsidiary Bonus 5 4.67 1.08 1.18 .26 3 7 
Yes Corporate Bonus 6 4.11 .83 .69 .20 3 7 
Note:   
1 = Government regulations on setting of transfer prices.  2 = Compensation Types.  3 = Compensation based on fixed salary.  4 
= Compensation based on fixed salary plus bonus based on Subsidiary‟s A profitability.  5 = Compensation based on fixed salary 
plus bonus based on Overall Corporate profitability.   
 
 
Table 5: Means of Transfer Prices Chosen and Predicted Choices 
 
Choice/ Cell # 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted Max Overall Corporate Profits 1 1 1 4 4 4 
Predicted Max Compensation N/A 7 1 N/A 7 4 
Means of Transfer Prices Chosen 3.11 4.11 2.67 3.56 4.67 4.11 
Note: N/A = Not Applicable.  Predicted Max Overall Corporate Profits = Predicted transfer price choice that would minimize 
government penalties on setting of transfer prices which in turns maximize overall corporate profits.  Predicted Max 
Compensation = Predicted transfer price choice that would maximize decision making‟s compensation.   
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
 
H1 specifically explored the main effects of government regulations on international transfer price choices.  
Table 6 depicts the ANOVA results and indicates the main effects of government regulations to be significant with 
regard to international transfer price choices (p=.001).   
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Table 6: ANOVA Results 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Dependent Variable: choice
43.333a 3 14.444 9.094 .000
1481.481 1 1481.481 932.735 .000
17.926 1 17.926 11.286 .001
25.407 2 12.704 7.998 .001
165.185 104 1.588
1690.000 108
208.519 107
Source
Corrected Model
Intercept
GOVTRSTR
COMP
Error
Total
Corrected Total
Type I II
Sum of
Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig.
R Squared = .208 (Adjusted R Squared = .185)a. 
 
            GOVTRSTR = Independent variable: Government Regulations 
            COMP = Independent variable: Compensation Types 
 
 
The overall significant effects from the ANOVA statistical analysis provided empirical evidence in line with 
the literature suggesting that government regulations did affect decision making in this study regarding international 
transfer price choices.   The results from H1 support the survey studies‟ findings that transfer pricing regulations 
indeed are important to the decision makers. In effect, governments that impose restrictions on transfer pricing may 
mitigate some of the profit shifting that could otherwise surface in the absence of such regulations.   
 
 Planned comparisons were conducted to compare the means of choices in the presence of government 
regulations conditions.  The cells of note, where this study would „a priori‟ expect differences relative to the 
government regulation variable, were #3 and #4. The t-test results in Table 7 show that at  0.1, the results indicate 
the means of transfer prices chosen by subjects receiving compensation based on subsidiary profit in the no Gov't Reg. 
condition (µ=2.67 for cell 3) were significantly different than the transfer prices chosen by those in the Gov't Reg. 
condition (µ=4.11 for cell 6, p=.002).   
 
Table 7: Summary of the T-test Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
Planned Comparisons - Means of Cells Compared      (I) - (J)  
  (I)                     (J)                     Mean 
Cell#          Mean          Cell#          Mean          Difference 
   1               3.11              4              3.56               -.45 
   2               4.11              5              4.67               -.56 
   3               2.67              6              4.11             -1.44 
 
t test 
Sig 
.281 
.195 
.002 
 
Cell 1 =  No Government Regulation, Fixed salary only 
Cell 4 = Have Government Regulations, Fixed salary only 
 
Cell 2 =  No Government Regulation, Fixed salary with a bonus based on subsidiary profitability 
Cell 5 = Have Government Regulations, Fixed salary with a bonus based on subsidiary profitability 
 
Cell 3 =  No Government Regulation, Fixed salary with a bonus based on overall corporate profitability 
Cell 6 = Have Government Regulations, Fixed salary with a bonus based on overall corporate profitability 
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Hypothesis 2: 
 
ANOVA results in Table 6 also show that the main effects of compensation on international transfer price 
choices were significant (p=.001). The overall results signify that transfer prices chosen by participants who received 
compensation with a bonus based on subsidiary profits significantly differed from those chosen by participants who 
either received compensation with a bonus based on overall corporate profits or compensation based on a fixed salary.  
In order to gain a better understanding of how compensation schemes affect transfer pricing decisions, t-test planned 
comparisons were performed. 
 
The results from the planned comparisons in Table 8 provide further understanding of how compensation 
types affected transfer price choices.  The cells of note based on a priori predicted differences were # 2 versus # 3 and 
# 5 versus # 6, respectively.  Government regulations on the setting of transfer prices, the means of transfer price 
choices were significantly different between compensation with bonus based on subsidiary profit (µ=4.11 for cell 2) 
and compensation with bonus based on overall corporate profit (cell 3 for µ=2.67). In the Gov't Reg. condition the 
difference between cell #5 (µ=4.67) and cell #6 (µ=4.11) was marginally significant of .094.  This outcome suggests 
that compensation type did significantly affect decision makers' transfer price choices in the absence of government 
regulations.  
 
 
Table 8: Summary Of The T-Test Results For Hypothesis 2 
 
Planned Comparisons - Means of Cells Compared      (I) - (J) 
  (I)                     (J)                     Mean 
Cell#          Mean          Cell#          Mean          Difference 
   2              4.11               3              2.67                1.44 
   5              4.67               6              4.11                  .56 
 
t test 
Sig 
.007 
.094 
 
Cell 2 =  No Government Regulation, Fixed salary with a bonus based on subsidiary profitability 
Cell 3 =  No Government Regulation, Fixed salary with a bonus based on overall corporate profitability 
 
Cell 5 = Have Government Regulations, Fixed salary with a bonus based on subsidiary profitability 
Cell 6 = Have Government Regulations,  Fixed salary with a bonus based on overall corporate profitability 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The results from this study provided empirical evidence that environmental factors, namely government 
regulations, significantly affected international transfer price choices.  However, The results also suggest that, 
notwithstanding the significant statistical results with respect to compensation, in the absence of government 
regulations decision makers on average did not necessarily choose optimal, corporate profit maximizing transfer 
prices, specifically with regard to minimizing overall corporate tax liabilities.   
 
However, when government regulations on the setting of transfer prices were present, as the literature 
suggested, agents could be induced by compensation contract mechanisms with a bonus based on overall corporate 
profits to choose transfer prices that lowered overall corporate government-imposed penalties, thereby increasing 
overall corporate profits. 
 
The findings of this study show that decision makers, indeed, were concerned about government-imposed 
penalties on transfer pricing manipulation. They tended to make decisions in the direction of improving overall 
corporate profits.  However, they did not choose the optimal transfer prices that would have maximized their 
compensation even though they were paid to do so.  The findings of this study support prior transfer pricing 
propositions that government regulations do affect decision making with respect to transfer pricing thus implying that 
governments should impose regulations and penalties if they are concerned with transfer pricing manipulations.   
However, these results may have been influenced by variables not controlled in the study.  Namely, participants may 
have been influenced by a lack of clear guidance as to what were the primary objectives of the organization.  Also, 
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some of the literature suggests that "fairness" as perceived among, subsidiary managers might play an important role 
in transfer price choice.  This might play out, for instance, when managers must interact with one another over 
multiple periods thus inducing choices that "evenly distribute" profits.  These two possible influences (corporate 
objectives and fairness) should lead to continuing research. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Anthony, R. N. and V. Govindarajan. 1998. Management Control Systems. 9th Edition. (International). USA: 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
2. Australian Taxation Office. 1997. Taxation Ruling TR 97/20 (Income Tax: Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing 
Methodologies for International Dealings. Canberra: Australia: (ATO). 
3. Australian Taxation Office. 1998. Taxation Ruling TR 98/11 (Income Tax: Documentation and Practical 
Issues Associated with Setting and Reviewing Transfer Pricing in International Dealings. Canberra: 
Australia: (ATO). 
4. Borkowski, S. C. 1997. The Transfer Pricing Concerns of Developed and Developing Countries. The 
International Journal of Accounting 32 (3): 321-336. 
5. Chan, C. 2001. International Transfer Pricing: A Comparison of Two Models.  Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation.  The Flinders University of South Australia. 
6. _______ and S. Landry. 2004.  An Examination of Profit Shifting Using Transfer Prices.  Working Paper.  
Monterey Institute of International Studies. 
7. Choi, F. D. S. and G. G. Mueller. 1992. International Accounting. 2nd Edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
8. International Accounting Standards Committee. 1997. IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. London: IASC. 
9. Radebaugh, L. H. and S. J. Gray. 1993. International Accounting and Multinational Enterprises. 3rd Edition. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
10. Schulz, A. K-D. 1999. Experimental Research Method in a Management Accounting Context. Accounting 
and Finance 39: 29-51. 
11. Tang, R. 1992. Transfer Pricing Practices in the 1990s. Management Accounting 73(8), Feb: 22-26. 
12. _______. 1997. Intrafirm Trade and Global Transfer Pricing Regulations.  Quorum Books. 
13. Tate, C. 1998. Transfer Pricing: The New Tax Minefield. Australian CPA July: 46-47. 
14. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1992. International Taxation: Problems Persist in Determining Tax 
Effects of Intercompany Prices. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
15. U.S. Treasury Department. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 1994. Internal Revenue Code Section 482. 
Washington, D.C.: IRS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal - October 2005                                    Volume 4, Number 10 
 10 
NOTES 
